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I. Introduction
The world’s oceans are in bad shape.  According to a 2008 article by
Jeremy Jackson, a marine ecologist at the Scripps Institution of 
Oceanography, we are well on our way to the next oceanic mass extinction.1  
We have no idea what the ultimate outcome will be, though we do know that 
it doesn’t look good for most plants and animals.2  Jellyfish and bacteria, 
“the rats and roaches of the sea,” are likely to fare well - already, severely 
degraded ecosystems like the Black and Caspian seas contain little else.3 
Even people with little affinity for the marine world should be 
concerned about this crash in oceanic biodiversity.  Oceanic and coastal 
ecosystems provide food for millions of people across the globe, as well as 
invaluable “ecosystem services” such as waste detoxification and flood 
control.4  A recent meta-analysis of existing data by Boris Worm, Jeremy 
Jackson, and twelve other researchers showed that biodiversity strongly 
enhances marine ecosystems’ food productivity, resource use efficiency, and 
resilience in the face of recurrent disturbances.5  A mass extinction would 
not just be bad news for snorkelers and seafood lovers, but for all marine 
ecosystems and the people who depend on them. 
The causes of this impending catastrophe include overfishing, habitat 
destruction, pollution, and global climate change, as well as the complex 
interactions among these factors.  Humans have been overexploiting coastal 
1. Jeremy B.C. Jackson, Ecological Extinction and Evolution in the Brave New Ocean,
105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 11458, 11458 (2008). 
2. Id.
3. Randy Olson, “Shifting Baselines: Slow-Motion Disaster in the Sea,”
ACTION BIOSCIENCE, Dec. 2002 (available at http://www.actionbioscience.org/ 
environment/olson.html). 
4. Boris Worm, Edward B. Barbier, et al., Impacts of Biodiversity Loss on Ocean
Ecosystem Services, SCIENCE, Nov. 3, 2006, at 787. 
5. Id.
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fisheries for centuries, but technological developments in the last fifty years 
now let fishermen land their yearly allowable catch in days, or even hours. 
Oceanic habitat is destroyed by enormous trawling ships, which drag huge 
weighted nets across the continental shelf, sometimes covering an entire 
fishery in less than a year. Pollution comes in the form of toxic chemicals 
and nutrient runoff, washing down rivers and through drainage systems and 
forming dead zones and algal blooms.  Climate change is warming the 
oceans and causing acidification of seawater, a trend that is likely to lead to 
mass mortality for corals and calcareous plankton. 
International law aimed at protecting the natural environment has 
blossomed in the last several decades, but the decline of the oceans must 
lead us to ask if existing laws and policies are adequate to the task.  In 
Section II of this essay, I will address the question of whether international 
treaties and conventions dealing with biodiversity are sufficient to protect 
marine ecosystems.  In Sections III through VI, I will  briefly describe some of 
the international laws that deal with each threat that Jackson describes - 
overfishing, habitat destruction, pollution, and climate change - and 
investigate how effective these laws have been so far.  Finally, in Section VII, 
I will explore the role and effectiveness of domestic law in the waters of 
Alaska, home of the largest whitefish fishery in the world. 
II. Protecting Marine Biodiversity
It might seem that the most sensible and direct way to protect
endangered oceanic biodiversity would be with laws explicitly designed for 
that purpose.  There are, in fact, several international agreements in place to 
protect biodiversity, from the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species (“CITES”), which boasts 175 Parties,6 to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (“CBD”), a United Nations-sponsored framework with 
193 Parties - almost every country, with the notable exception of the United 
States.7  
However, direct protection of the oceans’ biodiversity can be a tricky 
matter.  One problem is that, of the three general types of biodiversity - 
genetic diversity within a species, species diversity within an ecosystem, and 
ecosystem diversity (the range of different ecosystems existing on Earth)8 - 
laws like CITES (and the Endangered Species Act, the U.S. version of CITES) 
tend to focus exclusively on species diversity, thus missing both the bigger 
and the smaller picture.  Another problem is that while scientists know of 
6. See “What is CITES?”, available at www.cites.org/eng/disc/what.shtml.
7. See Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), “List of Parties,” available at
www.cbd.int/convention/parties/list. 
8. See, e.g., Donald K. Anton, Law for the Sea’s Biological Diversity, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 341, 344-45 (1997). 
 West  Northwest, Vol. 17, No. 2, Summer 2011 
194 
approximately 300,000 oceanic species, unknown species may number in the 
millions.9  For a species to gain protection under laws like the Endangered 
Species Act or CITES, it must first be “listed” as endangered or threatened.10  
Needless to say, this is an impossible feat for a species that has not even 
been identified, let alone studied.  
Perhaps the greatest problem of all for marine biodiversity is that 
while human beings seem to be primarily motivated by economic self-
interest, it is all but impossible to calculate the value (economic, intrinsic, 
or otherwise) of biodiversity, especially in the oceans, where it remains 
invisible to us.11  Regardless of such hurdles, it is worth beginning our survey 
with laws directed at biodiversity, if only to demonstrate why they are 
insufficient to protect marine species. 
A. Convention on Biological Diversity
In Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the United Nations held its Conference on 
Environment and Development, popularly known as the Earth Summit.12  
The conference featured the unveiling and signing of a pair of new 
environmental conventions: the Climate Change Convention and the CBD. 
Though the Governing Council of the UN Environment Programme originally 
intended the CBD to be an “umbrella convention,” consolidating and 
coordinating existing biodiversity law and filling in any gaps, this turned out 
to be politically impossible.  The existing CBD is a “framework” treaty, with 
“primarily aspirational provisions” still waiting for a future Conference of the 
Parties to give them substance and force.13 
Even as an aspirational text, the CBD is far too deferential to national 
sovereignty to have any real meaning.  Its central principle, as stated in 
Article 3, is that “States have . . . the sovereign right to exploit their own 
resources pursuant to their own environmental policies,” so long as their 
actions do not cause harm beyond their own boundaries.14  This 
counterproductive principle was seen as a necessary concession to the 
demands of the developing countries, which contain most of the world’s 
biodiversity and have been resistant to any limitations on their ability to 
9. John Charles Kunich, Losing Nemo: The Mass Extinction Now Threatening the
World’s Ocean Hotspots, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 13-14 (2005). 
10. Kalyani Robbins, Strength in Numbers: Setting Quantitative Criteria for Listing
Species Under the Endangered Species Act, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 4 (2009). 
11. Anton, supra note 8, at 346-47.
12. LAKSHMAN GURUSWAMY, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 39
(2nd ed. 2003). 
13. Id. at 133-34.
14. United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (hereinafter “CBD”),
art. 3, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818, 1993 A.T.S. 32 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993). 
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develop.15  However, in pandering to squeamish developing countries, the 
parties wound up with a treaty that “leaves adherence and implementation 
entirely up to the discretion of the signatories and provides no 
consequences for inaction” - in essence, a toothless treaty.16  
As for specifically marine biodiversity, the CBD says only that 
Convention provisions must be implemented “consistently with the rights 
and obligations of States under the law of the sea.”17  Though not mentioned 
by name, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is 
generally held to embody the existing law of the sea;18 it will be discussed in 
several sections below.  In 1995, the Second Conference of the Parties to the 
CBD explicitly addressed marine and coastal biological diversity in the 
Jakarta Mandate (“Mandate”).19  According to Professor Chris Wold, the 
Jakarta Mandate represented “relatively strong efforts” by the parties, but 
marine issues were barely mentioned at the Third Conference of the Parties, 
and little had been accomplished several years later.20  Still, Wold sees 
tremendous potential in the Mandate, especially in its advocacy of the 
precautionary principle and whole-ecosystem conservation.21 
B. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
Thirty years in the making, the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) finally emerged in 1982 and took an additional twelve 
years to enter into force.22  Because of the Convention’s broad sweep, it has 
been called “a ‘constitution’ for the oceans”23 and “[t]he overarching 
instrument of the oceans law pantheon.”24 Probably the most noteworthy 
result of UNCLOS is its resolution of the age-old debate over ocean 
jurisdiction.  Under UNCLOS, coastal states’ sovereignty extends for an area 
15. GURUSWAMY, supra note 12, at 135.
16. Tamara Mullen, The Convention on Biological Diversity and High-Seas Bottom
Trawling: The Means to an End, 14 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 135, 145 (2007). 
17. CBD, supra note 14, at art. 22.
18. A. Charlotte De Fontaubert, David R. Downes, & Tundi S. Agardy,
Biodiversity in the Seas: Implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity in Marine and Coastal 
Habitats, 10 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 753, 758 (1998). 
19. Robin Kundis Craig, Protecting International Marine Biodiversity: International
Treaties and National Systems of Marine Protected Areas, 20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. LAW 333, 
364 (2005).  
20. Chris Wold, The Futility, Utility, and Future Of The Biodiversity Convention, 9
COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 12 (1998). 
21. Id. at 27.
22. GURUSWAMY, supra note 12, at 391.
23. Id. at 392.
24. ROBIN WARNER, PROTECTING THE OCEANS BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION 27
(David Freestone ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009). 
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of 12 nautical miles from shore, a region called “the territorial sea.”25  Each 
coastal state also has jurisdiction over the area from its coast to 200 
nautical miles out to sea, called the Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”).26  
The expansion of state control over the area of the EEZ can be seen as 
a conservation incentive, in that states are more likely to create and enforce 
laws to protect resources that they “own.”  The CBD, for example, attempts 
to incentivize biodiversity protection by giving states intellectual property 
and other ownership rights to the biological resources within their 
jurisdictions.27  But for the oceans beyond national jurisdiction, commonly 
known as the high seas, the overarching governing principle of UNCLOS is 
“freedom of use and equal access by all states.”28  This freedom is not 
limitless, and several provisions of UNCLOS and its associated agreements 
attempt to place controls on, for example, overfishing (discussed in Section 
III below).  Even these, however, have failed to prevent the collapse of 
several international fisheries.29  If UNCLOS cannot adequately protect an 
international resource as lucrative as a fishery, it is unlikely to offer any real 
protection to less economically valuable species or ecosystems. 
The United States, in its embarrassing neglect of international law, has 
thus far declined to become a party to either the CBD or UNCLOS,30 though 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared in her 2009 confirmation hearing 
that ratification of UNCLOS was “long overdue” and would be a priority for 
her.31  As of mid-2010, UNCLOS was still awaiting attention from the U.S. 
Senate, despite broad-based support from industry, environmentalists, and 
the military.32 
C. Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
Another international treaty that (at least theoretically) protects 
25. De Fontaubert et al., supra note 18.
26. Id.
27. Anton, supra note 8, at 356.
28. Id. at 360.
29. Id. at 363.
30. See CBD, supra note 14; Oceans and Law of the Sea, Chronological lists of
ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and the related 
Agreements as at 06 November 2009, available at www.virginia.edu/colp/los.html 
(follow “Current List of Parties to the Convention and the Related Agreements (UN)” 
hyperlink). 
31. Council on Foreign Relations, Transcript of Hillary Clinton’s Confirmation
Hearing, available at www.cfr.org/publication/18225/transcript_of_hillary_clintons_ 
confirmation_hearing.html. 
32. John B. Bellinger III, Without White House Muscle, Treaties Left in Limbo, WASH.
POST, June 11, 2010. 
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marine species is the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, commonly known as CITES, which has 
been called “the flagship international agreement protecting wildlife.”33  The 
basic aim of CITES is to protect plant and animal diversity by controlling 
trade in endangered species.  However, since CITES came into force in 1975, 
global trade of endangered species has grown from an estimated $50 million 
to $100 million per year to an estimated $15 billion to $25 billion per year.34 
Two major issues help to explain why CITES has been so ineffective. 
First, the convention divides listed species into three Appendices, with the 
vast majority of species listed in Appendix II.35  Trade is allowed for 
Appendix II species as long as the exporting country makes an official 
finding that such trade poses no threat to species survival.36  With many 
states lacking the capacity, data, or “political will” to make a proper non-
detriment finding, this system allows trade in endangered species to 
continue despite inadequate knowledge of many of its impacts.37  The other 
major problem with CITES is that economic factors are allowed to play a role 
in the decision on whether or not to list a species in the first place.  In 2007, 
for example, a U.S. proposal to list all red and pink corals was successfully 
challenged by a group of politically powerful Italian artisans, who use the 
corals to make valuable jewelry.38  Not only do economic considerations 
undermine the very purpose of CITES (because effective trade restrictions 
will always harm someone’s economic interests), they also suggest an ugly 
willingness to prioritize the livelihoods of the rich and powerful. 
III. Overfishing
In a controversial 2001 paper in Science, Jeremy Jackson and eighteen
co-authors laid out the hypothesis that “humans have been disturbing 
marine ecosystems since they first learned how to fish.”39  The picture they 
painted was so dire as to lead to charges that they “had somehow focused 
33. James B. Murphy, Alternative Approaches to the CITES ‘Non-Detriment’ Finding for
Appendix II Species, 36 ENVTL. L. 531, 532 (2006). 
34. Jonathan Liljeblad, Finding Another Link in the Chain:  International Treaties and
Devolution to Local Law Enforcement in the Case of the Convention on the International Trade in 
Endangered Species, 18 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 527, 527-29 (2009). 
35. See “The CITES Species,” available at www.cites.org/eng/disc/species.shtml
(showing, as of July 2, 2010, a total of 33,033 Appendix II species, as compared with 
892 for Appendix I and 161 for Appendix III). 
36. Murphy, supra note 33, at 532-33.
37. Id. at 533.
38. Marjorie Mulhall, Saving the Rainforests of the Sea: An Analysis of International
Efforts to Conserve Coral Reefs, 19 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 321, 344 (2009). 
39. Jeremy B. C. Jackson, Michael X. Kirby, et al., Historical Overfishing and the
Recent Collapse of Coastal Ecosystems, SCIENCE, Jul. 27, 2001, at 629. 
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on only the worst-case scenarios,” an idea that Jackson took pains to 
disprove in his 2008 article.40  In fact, says Jackson, among the approximately 
eighty species his group studied, the majority of the mammal, bird, and 
reptile species were already “severely depleted” by 1900.41  Today, of the 
eighty species surveyed, 91% were found to be depleted, 31% rare, and 7% 
extinct.42  Moreover, heavy fishing of large, predatory species can have 
effects all the way down the food chain, in what is known as a “trophic 
cascade.”  Jackson cites the depletion of northwest Atlantic sharks, which led 
to an explosion of cownose rays, which in turn decimated coastal mollusk 
fisheries; similarly, the near-extinction of northeast Pacific sea otters led in 
turn to an overgrowth of sea urchins, which proceeded to consume “entire 
kelp forests.”43  The meta-analysis performed by Worm and Jackson et al. 
predicts “the global collapse of all taxa currently fished by the mid-21st 
century,” assuming the continuation of current trends.44 
Already, poorly managed fisheries and declining fish populations are 
costing the global fishing industry an estimated $50 billion per year.45  The 
global spread of modern fishing technology has given human beings an 
unprecedented capacity to decimate marine ecosystems, yet many people 
seem to hold fast to the archaic notion that the oceans contain an 
inexhaustible supply of fish.46 
A. UNCLOS and the Exclusive Economic Zone
Within the Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”), UNCLOS grants a 
number of rights to coastal States (e.g., exploiting natural resources, 
building artificial structures, and conducting scientific research), but it also 
imposes important responsibilities.  Article 61, Section 1, mandates that 
each coastal State set the allowable catch for fished species within its EEZ, 
while Section 2 requires each coastal State to use “the best scientific 
evidence available to it” to ensure that the marine life in its EEZ “is not 
endangered by over-exploitation.”47  Unfortunately, these requirements are 
somewhat undermined in Section 3, which states that conservation 
measures “shall also be designed to maintain or restore populations of 
40. Jackson, supra note 1, at 11459.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 11460.
44. Worm, supra note 4.
45. Eric A. Bilsky, Symposium: Territory Without Boundaries: Colonizing Natural
Resources: Conserving Marine Wildlife Through World Trade Law, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 599, 601 
(2009). 
46. Id. at 601-03.
47. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), art. 61, Dec.
10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982). 
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harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable 
yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors, 
including the economic needs of coastal fishing communities and the 
special requirements of developing States.”48  It is worth examining this 
provision more closely. 
First of all, given the choice between “maintaining” and “restoring” fish 
stocks, most countries will choose the former, thereby guaranteeing that any 
reduction in fish populations will become permanent.  In fact, people often 
do not even realize that a fish stock has been depleted.  Standards shift 
gradually downward as “each new generation takes as its baseline for 
comparison the abundance of marine wildlife its members experience when 
they first observe the sea.”49  This phenomenon is known as “shifting 
baselines.”  The term was first used in 1995 by Daniel Pauly, a Canadian 
fisheries biologist, but it has been adopted to describe all types of slow, 
difficult-to-notice environmental degradation.50  In the under-explored and 
little-monitored world of the oceans, however, the problem is especially 
acute, which is probably why the oceans awareness project co-created by 
Jeremy Jackson can be found at “shiftingbaselines.org.” 
The second problem with UNCLOS Article 61 is its stated goal of 
producing the “maximum sustainable yield” of harvested species.  The 
maximum sustainable yield (“MSY”) concept was developed in the 1950s, 
and even then many scientists believed it was not an appropriate goal for 
fisheries management.51  The model is based on the idea that, if a species is 
harvested, the remaining individuals will have more food and will thus grow 
and reproduce more.  The larger the catch, the more “productive” the 
remaining stock, meaning that allowable catches should be set at the 
highest point that will allow full replenishment by the next year. 
Unfortunately, many fish stocks will actually crash when reduced to a low 
density.52  Also, the eggs of younger fish may be weaker and less viable, 
meaning that heavier catches of larger individuals may result in a “year class 
failure.”53  
Even where the MSY model works (in theory) for a single fish species, 
the “sustainability” in question does not consider the effects of the fish 
catch on marine habitat, accidentally caught species (bycatch), or the local 
48. Id.
49. Bilsky, supra note 45, at 602.
50. Olson, supra note 3.
51. CHARLES CLOVER, THE END OF THE LINE: HOW OVERFISHING IS CHANGING THE
WORLD AND WHAT WE EAT, 104-06 (2006). 
52. P.A. Larkin, Fisheries Management - An Essay for Ecologists, 9 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY
& SYSTEMATICS 57, 64-5 (1978). 
53. Id.
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oceanic food chain.54  Also, translating the MSY model to practice requires 
extensive data (with no gaps or cheating) and an otherwise unchanging 
environment, leaving it vulnerable (like many theoretical models) to the 
unpredictability of the real world.  This was well illustrated by the dramatic 
collapse of the Peruvian anchoveta fishery in the early 1970s, when the 
warmer waters of El Niño lowered fish numbers, which were then nearly 
wiped out under the MSY-inspired allowable catch of 10 million tons/year.55  
Peru’s problem was not just a matter of time or money - in the 
comparatively wealthy U.S., as recently as 2007, fishery managers had 
sufficient data for only 36% of exploited fish stocks.56 
A third problem with the UNCLOS conservation directive is that it 
strives for MSY “as qualified by relevant environmental and economic 
factors.”  This qualifier is reminiscent of the “where possible” inserted into a 
similar fisheries directive at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable 
Development, the follow-up to 1992’s Earth Summit.  Journalist Charles 
Clover was present at the 2002 Johannesburg summit, and remembers 
thinking that “the assembled diplomats of the world” were extremely 
pleased that they need only maintain or restore fish stocks “where possible,” 
meaning that “they now didn’t have to do anything at all.”57 
Finally, Article 61 states that the factors influencing MSY should 
include “the economic needs of coastal fishing communities and the special 
requirements of developing States.”  The latter is a polite way of saying that 
a state may plead poverty in order to avoid taking any conservation 
measures.  The former allows states to undermine their own conservation 
efforts when under political pressure from the fishing industry.  Fishing 
enterprises already have a strong incentive to build up their catch capacity 
in order to compete with each other for the largest share of the total 
allowable catch.58  These overgrown fishing fleets then pressure their 
governments for subsidies, higher catch quotas, and purchased fishing 
rights in foreign waters when there is not enough fish to catch at home. 
Globally, subsidies to the fishing industry total somewhere between 
$20 billion and $50 billion per year, while the global fleet “is estimated to be 
two and a half times greater than needed to catch what the ocean can 
sustainably produce.”59  In Canada, conservation measures are “set up to 
fail - necessarily,” according to Canadian fisheries biologist Ransom Myers, 
because unemployment insurance allows fishermen to maintain oversized 
54. Bilsky, supra note 45, at 606.
55. Colin W. Clark, Bioeconomics of the Ocean, 31 BIOSCIENCE 231, 232-3 (1981).
56. Bilsky, supra note 45, at 607.
57. CLOVER, supra note 51, at 106.
58. Bilsky, supra note 45, at 609.
59. Id. at 137-9.
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fishing fleets, creating constant pressure to raise allowable catches.60  Given 
the obvious need for developed countries to stand up to their overgrown 
fishing industries and shift employment elsewhere, one wonders why a 
global convention would urge states to consider the economic needs of 
coastal fishing communities when developing fish conservation strategies. 
Perhaps it is time for coastal fishing communities to consider the economic 
and environmental needs of their own states. 
B. UNCLOS and the High Seas
UNCLOS attempts to tackle overfishing on the high seas (areas of the 
ocean outside of any country’s EEZ) in Articles 117-19.  Articles 117 and 118 
require states to adopt conservation measures for their citizens and to 
cooperate with other states in the conservation of living resources, but do 
not list any specifics (aside from suggesting that states establish regional 
fisheries bodies).  Article 119, the heart of the matter, says that conservation 
measures (including determination of the allowable catch) should be 
designed “to maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels 
which can produce the maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant 
environmental and economic factors.”61  This should sound familiar by now. 
Articles 63 and 64 of UNCLOS address the problem of fish stocks 
covering an area beyond a single state’s EEZ.  Though no new principles or 
goals are listed, the two articles instruct States who fish for such stocks to 
cooperate on conservation measures, either bilaterally or through regional 
fisheries organizations.62 UNCLOS Annex I provides a list of “highly 
migratory species” that require this cooperation, including eight species of 
tuna plus entire taxonomic families of cetaceans (whales, dolphins, and 
porpoises) and oceanic sharks.63  This issue was taken up in much more 
detail in the 1995 U.N. Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks, which will be discussed below. 
The original UNCLOS provisions covering straddling stocks64 and 
highly migratory fish stocks provided a basis for cooperation, but it soon 
became evident that simply establishing regional fisheries was not 
sufficient.  For one thing, the regional bodies had no power to control 
fishing by nonmembers.  Thus, when the Northwest Atlantic Fishing 
Organization (“NAFO”) reduced its total allowable catch for the period of 
60. CLOVER, supra note 51, at 133-4.
61. UNCLOS, supra note 47, at art. 117-19.
62. Id. at art. 63-4.
63. Id. at ann. I.
64. “Straddling stocks” are defined as “stocks occurring within the exclusive
economic zones of two or more coastal States or both within the exclusive economic 
zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to it.”  Id. at art. 63. 
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1986-92, nationals of nonmember states increased their catch in the same 
area by 27.7%.65 
Another problem with regional fisheries was lack of enforcement.  This 
was illustrated by the “turbot war” between Canada and Spain in the mid-
1990s, precipitated by what became known as “the Estai incident.”  The Estai 
was a Spanish trawler that was fishing for turbot outside of Canada’s EEZ for 
five months in 1994-95.66  A Canadian gunboat approached the trawler on 
March 9, 1995, whereupon the Estai’s crew cut the nets loose and tried to 
flee.  The Canadians caught, boarded, and seized the trawler, setting off a 
wave of international recrimination, including accusations of piracy.67  The 
Canadian Minister of Fisheries, Brian Tobin, protested, “We’re down now 
finally to one last, lonely, unloved, unattractive little turbot clinging on by 
its fingernails to the Grand Banks of Newfoundland.”68  Canada, incidentally, 
had set limits on turbot fishing in order to protect its last viable fishery, after 
watching its once-tremendous cod stock dwindle down to almost nothing by 
the early 1990s.69 
With regards to Canada’s unilateral, extrajurisdictional enforcement 
action against the Estai, the applicable international law is rather muddy at 
best.  Spain quickly filed a complaint against Canada with the International 
Court of Justice (“ICJ”), alleging violations of its vessel’s right to navigate and 
fish in international waters.70  Canada asserted that the ICJ lacked 
jurisdiction to hear the case because of a Canadian reservation specifically 
excluding from ICJ jurisdiction “disputes arising out of or concerning 
conservation and management measures taken by Canada with respect to 
vessels fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area . . . and the enforcement of such 
measures.”71  In 1998, the ICJ agreed with Canada that it lacked jurisdiction 
to hear the dispute.72  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Federal Court of Canada 
found in 2005 that the seizure of the Estai was not illegal, though Canada 
was ordered to pay $137,000 to the ship’s owners for lost income and 
65. GURUSWAMY, supra note 12, at 400.
66. David R. Teece, Global Overfishing and the Spanish-Canadian Turbot War: Can
International Law Protect the High-Seas Environment? 8 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 89, 89 
(1997). 
67. Id. at 90.
68. Court Backs Canada’s Seizure of Trawler During ‘Turbot War,’ CBC News, July 27,
2005, available at www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2005/07/27/Turbot-Estai-050727.html. 
69. Teece, supra note 66, at 92-3.
70. Id. at 97.
71. Summaries of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders of the
International Court of Justice, Case Concerning  Fisheries Jusisdiction (Spain v. 
Canada) at 49, available at www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/96/7535.pdf. 
72. Id. at 45.
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expenses.73  
C. 1995 U.N. Agreement on Straddling and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks
By the time of the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, it was obvious that 
stronger measures were necessary to protect migratory fish stocks, and a 
United Nations conference was planned to address the topic.74  The 
subsequent international uproar over the Estai incident only served to 
illustrate a chronic problem with the UNCLOS system of “freedom of fishing” 
on the high seas: while coastal States had an economic incentive to manage 
and conserve the fish stocks within their jurisdiction, “distant water fishing 
States” could (and did) simply come over and concentrate their efforts in the 
area just beyond the coastal state’s 200-mile limit.75  Many of the fish 
species that habitually migrated across these arbitrary boundaries were 
becoming overexploited, and as Canada had demonstrated, coastal states 
were becoming desperate for ways to enforce their conservation efforts 
beyond the EEZ. 
On August 4, 1995, the UN conference planned at the Earth Summit 
bore fruit of real substance (if less-than-delightful nomenclature): the 
United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 
relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (“SFSA” for short), which entered into force in 
2001.76  Like UNCLOS, the SFSA uses regional fishery organizations as the 
primary vehicle for conservation of straddling and migratory fish stocks. 
However, the SFSA “compels greater cooperation between coastal states and 
distant-water flag states” by requiring all flag states to join the regional 
fisheries that govern the areas they fish, or at least to follow the rules set by 
these fisheries.77  The Agreement also establishes an enforcement 
procedure, in which officials from a regional fishery can “board and inspect” 
any ship within the fishery’s area in order to ensure compliance with local 
rules.78  If there is an alleged violation, the “inspecting state” notifies the 
ship’s flag state, which must respond within three days.79  
73. CBC News, supra note 68.
74. WARNER, supra note 24, at 101.
75. Id.
76. United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, 1995
Agreement Overview, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_ 
agreements/convention_overview_fish_stocks.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2009). 
77. GURUSWAMY, supra note 12, at 400-1.
78. Id. at 401.
79. Id.
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Charles Clover’s description of this process in action makes for some 
depressing reading.  Clover requested and obtained official observer reports 
from the European Commission on some of its vessels that fish in the 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (“NAFO”) fishery.80  He found that 
“on seventy-two days of 2002, EU vessels deliberately targeted several 
species for which fishing was banned.”81  Moreover, Spanish and Portuguese 
authorities frequently either declined to inspect their own vessels after 
reported violations, or performed the inspections and somehow found “no 
infringements.”82  Canadian officials, understandably frustrated, can do little 
more than continue to report violations, which are not acted on, and publish 
an annual compendium of observers’ reports, selectively edited to exclude 
“many of the most damaging details” so as to avoid another international 
fracas.83  Perhaps it is a measure of the relative strength of the SFSA regime 
that ruthless fishing nations must now actually break the law in order to 
continue some of their most egregious practices, but such chronic 
lawlessness still indicates the ongoing need for more effective enforcement. 
Moreover, the (often government-subsidized) overcapacity of the global 
fishing fleet exerts constant pressure on regional fishery organizations to 
raise catch limits beyond the point of sustainability.84 
D. International Plan of Action for the Management of
Fishing Capacity
In 1995, the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”) issued a 
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, an aspirational document that 
sought to address the problems of the unsustainable global fishing 
industry.85  Along with the Code, the FAO also developed a set of 
International Plans of Action to help implement the Code’s most important 
principles.86  One of these was the International Plan of Action for the 
Management of Fishing Capacity, which calls on states to take “actions such 
as monitoring fishing capacity, reducing subsidies that affect capacity, 
and . . . retiring vessels from service or even dismantling them when 
necessary.”87  Though the Code and the Plans of Action are not binding, they 
do at least present a starting place for states willing to address their 
80. CLOVER, supra note 51, at 170-1.
81. Id. at 170.
82. Id. at 171-2.
83. Id. at 170-3.
84. See Bilsky, supra note 45, at 615-16.
85. Harry N. Scheiber, Kathryn J. Mengerink, & Yann-huei Song, Ocean Tuna
Fisheries, East Asian Rivalries, and International Regulation: Japanese Policies and the 
Overcapacity/IUU Fishing Conundrum, 30 HAWAII L. REV. 97, 102 (2007). 
86. Id.
87. Id.
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overcapacity problems. 
One issue for capacity reduction efforts is that fishing vessels can often 
simply relocate, or just re-register, in another State with fewer restrictions. 
This move is sometimes known as “flag-hopping,” and the flag of the new, 
more permissive state is called a flag of convenience (“FOC”).88  When 
Taiwan signed a 1999 capacity-reduction agreement with Japan, for example, 
Taiwanese ship owners reflagged their vessels en masse - by the end of 2003, 
fifty of the fifty-one operational large Taiwanese long-line tuna vessels were 
under FOCs.89  Japan tried to circumvent this problem by requiring that 
vessels actually be scrapped, instead of just de-licensed, but this proved 
difficult to enforce.90  Reportedly, some of the “scrapped” Japanese vessels 
were partially dismantled, shipped to other countries, and then 
reassembled, while other vessels had their engines and other parts salvaged 
and sold overseas.91  Biologists Daniel Pauly and Jay Maclean recommend 
that retired fishing vessels be filled with concrete, as with retired Soviet 
tanks, or, fittingly, publicly sunk to the bottom of the sea to become 
valuable fish habitat.92 
E. Addressing Subsidies to the Fishing Industry Through
the World Trade Organization
Because destructive fishing practices and fleet overcapacity are 
enabled by government subsidies, the World Trade Organization’s (“WTO”) 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM”) may be one 
of the best tools available for fighting overfishing.93  Though it may seem 
strange to tackle conservation issues through a trade agreement, the WTO 
offers something that most international forums can only dream of - an 
effective enforcement mechanism.94  WTO decisions are binding on member 
States (which presently include all of the world’s major fishing nations 
except Russia), and may be backed up with trade sanctions.95  The U.S. has 
been a strong supporter of WTO action on fishing subsidies and has worked 
with numerous other member countries (collectively known as “Friends of 
Fish”) to put these subsidies on the agenda for the most recent round of 
88. Id. at 115.
89. Id. at 118-19.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 118.
92. DANIEL PAULY & JAY MACLEAN, IN A PERFECT OCEAN: THE STATE OF FISHERIES AND
ECOSYSTEMS IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN 98 (2003). 
93. Bilsky, supra note 45, at 616-17.
94. Id. at 622.
95. Id.
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WTO negotiations.96 
The latest negotiating round began in Doha, Qatar, in 2001.  In a 
promising move, the Doha Declaration assigned the issue of fishing 
subsidies to the “Rules” Negotiating Group, which is empowered to 
negotiate amendments to the SCM.97  For the first phase of negotiations, the 
Friends of Fish countries submitted a paper outlining the problems with 
fishing subsidies and the reasons why the SCM was not addressing them 
effectively.98  On the other side of the debate were Japan and Korea, who 
generally denied that fishing subsidies were harmful to trade or marine 
conservation efforts.99  In 2003, the European Community (one of the largest 
fishing subsidizers) added momentum to the talks by submitting their own 
proposal for measures to limit fishing subsidies.100 
Sadly, the Doha negotiations collapsed at the September 2003 meeting 
in Cancun, and despite a few sputtering moves forward the Doha agenda 
remains stalled as of mid-2010.101  In the meantime, over 100 bilateral and 
regional trade deals have been completed since 2001, indicating that 
countries may be shifting focus away from the ideologically deadlocked WTO 
and towards smaller regional agreements.102  In response, the U.S. appears 
to be shifting its fish protection efforts to regional and bilateral forums.  In 
2006, for example, the U.S. Congress amended the Magnuson-Stevens Act 
(discussed in Section VII below), “directing the United States to proceed 
bilaterally and multilaterally through various entities, including regional 
fishery management organizations (“RFMOs”), to address IUU (illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated) fishing, bycatch of PLMRs (protected living 
marine resources), and related issues.”103  
IV. Habitat Destruction
In the introduction to his 2006 book about the perils of overfishing,
96. Alice L. Mattice, The Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations in the World Trade
Organization: A ‘Win-Win-Win’ for Trade, the Environment and Sustainable Development, 34 
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 573, 574-79 (2004). 
97. Bilsky, supra note 45, at 628.
98. Id. At that point, the Friends of Fish included Australia, Chile, Ecuador,
Iceland, New Zealand, Peru, the Philippines, and the United States. 
99. Mattice, supra note 96, at 583.
100. Id. at 584-85.
101. See Bilsky, supra note 45, at 629-31; Heba Aly, G20 Summit: Less-Developed
Nations Still Struggle to Shape Agenda, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 25, 2010. 
102. See Afta Doha; Trade, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 6, 2008.
103. National Marine Fisheries Service, Implementation of Title IV of the Magnuson-
Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 2006: Progress Report 1, 
April 2010, available at www.nmfs.noaa.gov/msa2007/docs/hsdfmpa_2010_ 
progress_report.pdf. 
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Charles Clover attempts to describe what bottom trawling might look like if 
practiced on land: two huge vehicles with a mile of net stretched between 
them, hurtling across the African plain and scooping up all but the smallest 
animals, predator and prey alike.  A huge iron roller bar attached to the net’s 
bottom edge drags along the ground, flushing more animals into the net 
and crushing every tree, bush, or outcropping in its path.104  This ludicrous 
picture, as Clover points out, is more or less played out “the world over every 
day,” except that the vehicles are trawlers and the African plain is the 
bottom of the sea.105  
Trawling destroys seafloor habitat and disrupts associated ecosystems. 
In the open ocean, trawlers strip the coral and sponges from delicate 
seamount ecosystems and dredge up sediment clouds that block light and 
can choke whatever organisms remain.106  In heavily fished areas like New 
England and the Gulf of Mexico, more than half of the vast areas fished by 
trawling are exploited more than once a year, allowing “no opportunity for 
ecosystem recovery.”107  
A. Convention on Biological Diversity
In theory, the Convention on Biological Diversity should apply to 
bottom trawling, as its provisions apply both within the parties’ national 
jurisdiction and to any “processes and activities” under a party’s “jurisdiction 
or control,” “regardless of where their effects occur.”108  Additionally, the 
primary principle of the CBD is that states have the right to exploit their own 
resources and “the responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment . . . of areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”109  However, as discussed in 
Section II supra, the CBD is a toothless treaty with no binding language and 
no compliance mechanism.  If a biodiversity convention cannot put a dent in 
outright species decimation, there is no chance that it will effectively 
address habitat destruction. 
B. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 61/105
Beginning in 2003, the UN General Assembly has issued yearly 
resolutions on a rather unwieldy topic: “Sustainable fisheries, including 
through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the 
104. CLOVER, supra note 51, at 1.
105. Id at 2.
106. Mullen, supra note 16, at 139-40.
107. Jackson, supra note 1, at 11460-1.
108. CBD, supra note 14, at art. 4.
109. Id at art. 3.
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United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 
relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related instruments.”110  In 2006, a major 
diplomatic effort spearheaded by the tiny island nation of Palau111 managed 
to insert twelve new paragraphs into the yearly resolution on “Sustainable 
fisheries etc.” (UNGA Resolution 61/105), calling on states to take immediate 
action to “protect vulnerable marine ecosystems, including seamounts, 
hydrothermal vents and cold water corals, from destructive fishing 
practices.”112  This new section commands regional fisheries organizations to 
“assess, on the basis of the best available scientific information, whether 
individual bottom fishing activities would have significant adverse impacts 
on vulnerable marine ecosystems,” and if so, “to prevent such impacts” 
through management or an outright ban.113 
Unfortunately, UN General Assembly Resolutions are generally held to 
be nonbinding “recommendations,” though any country may decide to take 
them more seriously as authoritative sources of international law.114  For 
example, when the UN General Assembly passed a resolution in 1992 calling 
for a global moratorium on pelagic driftnet fishing, the United States backed 
this resolution with the threat of sanctions against noncomplying 
countries.115  The U.S. backing gave teeth to the driftnet resolution, leading 
to “significant worldwide reductions in high seas driftnet fishing.”116  Similar 
measures can and should be used to deter bottom trawling, especially on 
the high seas, where the high costs of deepwater trawling are often not even 
sustainable without massive government subsidies.117  On the other hand, 
the very existence of such subsidies is evidence of the perverse incentives 
and political pressures that will have to be addressed before the global 
fishing industry can be effectively controlled. 
110. See Oceans and the Law of the Sea in the General Assembly of the United Nations,
General Assembly Resolutions and Decisions, available at http://www.un.org/ 
Depts/los/general_assembly/general_assembly_resolutions.htm. 
111. See, generally, Peter Prows, A Mouse Can Roar: Small Island States, the United
Nations, and the End of Free-For-All Fishing on the High Seas, 19 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 1 (2008). 
112. G.A. Res. 61/105, P 80, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/105 (Mar. 6, 2007).
113. Id. at P 83(a).
114. See, generally, Gregory J. Kerwin, The Role of United Nations General Assembly
Resolutions in Determining Principles of International Law in United States Courts, 1983 DUKE 
L.J. 876 (1983).
115. Prows, supra note 111, at 10-11.
116. Id. at 11.
117. Bilsky, supra note 45, at 618-19.
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V. Pollution
Most oceanic pollution is actually from land-based sources, which may
be divided into point sources (like sewer pipes) and non-point sources (like 
agricultural runoff).118  Jeremy Jackson also uses the term broadly to include 
the “biological pollution” of foreign species introduced into a new marine 
ecosystem.119  In coastal seas and estuaries, land-based chemical pollution 
and introduced species have surpassed overfishing as threats to 
biodiversity.120 
A. The IMO Conventions
The International Maritime Organization (“IMO”) dates back to 1948, 
when the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (“IMCO”) 
was created to oversee international shipping matters.121  Although the 
original IMCO Convention made no mention of environmental concerns, 
these were brought to the fore by the 1967 Torrey Canyon oil tanker spill off 
the coast of England, which revealed the inadequacies of the international 
system for handling oil spills.122  The 1975 amendments to the Convention 
created a Marine Environment Protection Committee within the 
organization, and added to the Convention’s purposes “the prevention and 
control of marine pollution from ships.”123  Since the Torrey Canyon spill, the 
IMO (now a specialized agency of the UN) has drafted and adopted a 
number of conventions dealing with environmental issues, including waste 
dumping, biological contamination from ships’ ballast water, and oil spills. 
Deliberate dumping of matter into the ocean accounts for less than 
10% of oceanic pollution, but it tends to be concentrated in the ecologically 
rich areas near coasts.124  In 1972, the IMO’s Convention on the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, also known as 
the London Convention, “placed a formidable international legal firewall 
between clean seas and irresponsible dumping practices.”125  Though the 
London Convention does not prohibit all deliberate ocean dumping, it does 
118. David Freestone, A Decade of the Law of the Sea Convention: Is It a Success? 39
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 499, 502 (2007). 
119. Jackson, supra note 1, at 11459.
120. Id.
121. International Maritime Organization (IMO), Convention on the
International Maritime Organization, available at www.imo.org (select “Legal” tab, then 
select “IMO Conventions”). 
122. Id.
123. Id. The 1975 amendments also rechristened the organization as the IMO.
124. See Alan Sielen, The New International Rules on Ocean Dumping: Promise and
Performance, 21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 295, 297 (2009). 
125. Id.
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prohibit dumping of certain materials and require a permit for others.126  In 
1996, an ambitious new Protocol to the Convention updated the original 
agenda with modern environmental concepts like the precautionary 
approach, the “polluter pays” principle, and the need to ensure that 
pollution control efforts in one area do not simply relocate the pollution to 
another area.127 
In 2004, the International Convention for the Control and Management 
of Ship’s Ballast Water and Sediments, also known as the Ballast Water 
Convention, was created to address “the threat posed by aquatic organisms 
and pathogens contained in ballast water.”128  When commercial ships are 
not carrying a heavy cargo load, they usually take on water, known as ballast 
water, to increase their stability.129  When a ship reaches port and prepares 
to take on cargo, it will discharge the ballast water, along with any number 
of foreign species, from bacteria and viruses to small fish.130  A study of cargo 
ships arriving in Oregon found over 360 different foreign species in the 
vessels’ ballast water.131  Once an invasive species establishes itself in a new 
ecosystem, it may feed on or infect native species, or compete with them for 
food and space.132  The jellyfish infesting the Black and Caspian Seas, 
mentioned in Section I, is the North American Comb Jelly, an American 
invasive species whose voracious appetite for zooplankton likely contributed 
to the collapse of Black Sea fisheries.133  But invasive species go both ways - 
Caspian Sea zebra mussels, now firmly established in the U.S. Great Lakes, 
have degraded ecosystems, clogged drainage pipes, and caused billions of 
dollars’ worth of damage.134 
The IMO’s direct response to the 1967 Torrey Canyon oil spill was the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 
commonly known as MARPOL.135  MARPOL addresses nearly every type of 
non-biological pollution from ships, including oil, sewage, garbage, and air 
pollution.136  Unfortunately, like the other IMO conventions, MARPOL is 
restricted to pollution from ships, and thus fails to cover the majority of 
126. Craig, supra note 19, at 355.
127. Sielen, supra note 124, at 302-05.
128. Cory Hebert, Ballast Water Management: Federal, State, and International
Regulations, 37 S.U. L. REV. 315, 344-46 (2010).  
129. Brent C. Foster, Pollutants Without Half-Lives: The Role of Federal Environmental
Laws in Controlling Ballast Water Discharges of Exotic Species, 30 ENVTL. L. 99, 101-02 (2000). 
130. Id. at 102.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 105.
133. Hebert, supra note 128, at 319.
134. Id. at 319-320.
135. Craig, supra note 19, at 356.
136. Id. at 356-57.
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marine pollution, which originates on land. Even in the realm of ship-based 
pollution,  MARPOL has not been particularly effective, largely due to its 
reliance on port States to enforce its regulations.137 
B. UNCLOS and the IMO
Despite its considerable size, UNCLOS is still in many ways a 
framework convention, in that it depends on organizations like the IMO to 
develop more specific conventions in order to implement its goals.138  When 
UNCLOS directs that States must enforce “generally accepted international 
standards,” these include the agreements developed by the IMO.139 
Unfortunately, the fairly comprehensive UNCLOS/IMO prescriptive regime is 
not matched by an especially effective enforcement regime.  As with 
overfishing, most vessel pollution control measures under UNCLOS are 
meant to be enforced primarily by a vessel’s flag State (State of registration), 
allowing shady vessel owners to opt for sailing under a flag of convenience 
instead of complying with the law.140 
The “flag State problem” has not gone unnoticed by the international 
community.  The UN General Assembly issues yearly resolutions calling on 
flag States to ensure compliance of their vessels with international laws or 
stop registering vessels altogether.141  Many countries have beefed up 
foreign vessel inspections within their own ports or territories, a measure 
known as “Port State Control.”142  Port States, however, can do little to 
enforce pollution controls for ships on the high seas, and lax enforcement 
by some flag States continues to pose a problem for the international legal 
community.143 
Unlike the IMO conventions, which are centered on ships, UNCLOS 
attempts to cover all marine issues, including land-based pollution. 
Unfortunately, the UNCLOS provisions requiring parties to “prevent, reduce 
and control” land-based pollution sources have proven to be largely 
ineffective.144  Again, enforcement is a problem - it is all but impossible to 
determine which state is responsible for pollution discovered in another 
137. Matthew Schroeder, Forgotten at Sea – An International Call to Combat Islands of
Plastic Waste in the Pacific Ocean, 16 SW. J. INT’L L. 265, 273-74 (2010). 
138. Craig H. Allen, Revisiting the Thames Formula: The Evolving Role of the
International Maritime Organization and Its Member States in Implementing the 1982 Law of the 
Sea Convention, 10 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 265, 274-76 (2009). 
139. Id .at 292.
140. Id. at 300-02.
141. Id. at 312.
142. Id. at 307.
143. Id. at 324-25.
144. See Freestone, supra note 118, at 502-03.
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state’s waters.145 
C. Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the
Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities
In an effort to better address the problem of land-based pollution, the 
U.N. Environment Programme (“UNEP”) held a summit in 1995 which 
resulted in the “Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment from Land-Based Activities” (“GPA”).146  Though the GPA itself 
has no legal force, it serves as a template for States wishing to create their 
own binding rules.147  Thus far, regional bodies have been more successful 
than states in implementing the GPA, possibly due to the greater perceived 
benefit of regional cooperative agreements.148  The Mediterranean states, for 
example, revised the Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean 
Sea Against Pollution (the Barcelona Convention, originally adopted in 
1976) to incorporate elements of the GPA.149  However, the revisions 
pertaining to land-based pollution sources have yet to enter into force, as 
their requirements are too strict for some of the parties.150 
VI. Climate Change
Climate change has two primary effects on the ocean: acidification and
surface warming.  Acidification is directly caused by the increase in carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere, as some of the carbon is absorbed by the 
seawater to form carbonic acid.151  Because of this process, the ocean is 
often referred to as a “carbon sink,” meaning that it plays an important role 
in regulating atmospheric carbon dioxide.152  Unfortunately, even a mild 
increase in acidity inhibits the ability of calcareous marine organisms to 
grow and form their shells or exoskeletons, which in turn disrupts the 
145. Schroeder, supra note 137, at 274-75.
146. Freestone, supra note 118, at 502-03.
147. Schroeder, supra note 137, at 277-78.
148. Freestone notes that land-based marine pollution poses “a classic
‘tragedy of the commons’ issue, as the costs of reducing those land-based sources 
must be borne by coastal or riverine states, often many miles from the sea, while the 
impact is on the global commons: the oceans.”  Supra note 118, at 503. 
Unfortunately, the same could be said for overfishing, habitat destruction, and 
climate change. 
149. Schroeder, supra note 137, at 278-79.
150. Id.
151. Jackson, supra note 1, at 11461.
152. See, e.g., Paul Quay, Carbon Sink: The Role of Oceans, GEOTIMES, Sept. 1992, at
16; Inez Y. Fung, Scott C. Doney, Keith Lindsay and Jasmin John, Evolution of Carbon 
Sinks in a Changing Climate, 102 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 11201 (2005). 
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oceanic carbon cycle and slows or stops the formation of coral reefs.153  
Corals are also vulnerable to rising water temperatures, the other 
major effect of climate change on the oceans.  Warming has already begun 
to cause coral death, known as “bleaching,” a process that has accelerated 
during the last twenty or thirty years.154  Warmer surface water also keeps 
cooler, nutrient-rich subsurface water from circulating to the surface, leading 
to thermal stratification of the water column and lower biological 
productivity.155  This, in turn, lowers fish numbers, and in poorly managed 
fisheries may lead to a crash,156 as seen in the El Niño-induced crash of the 
Peruvian anchoveta fishery mentioned in Section III, supra.  The World Bank 
predicts that, as climate change leads to increased climatic variability, 
cyclical patterns like the El Niño/La Niña events will become more extreme, 
with future moderate El Niño events showing effects similar to a strong El 
Niño event today, and future strong El Niño events having unknown, but 
possibly disastrous, consequences.157 
International law regulating climate change is founded on the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), another 
convention to emerge from the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio.158  The UNFCCC is 
currently being implemented under the Kyoto Protocol, adopted at the third 
Conference of the Parties (“COP3”) in 1997 and entered into force in 2005.159  
In December 2009, the 15th COP met in Copenhagen to try to work out a new 
protocol, a meeting that Time magazine labeled “perhaps the most important 
environmental summit in the history of the world.”160  The results, as readers 
may recall, were extremely disappointing. 
A. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change
While certainly an essential first step on the path to a global carbon-
emissions regime, the UNFCCC itself contains only the most general goals 
and provisions.  The Convention’s objective is the “[s]tabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
153. Jackson, supra note 1, at 11461, 11463.
154. Id. at 11463.
155. Id. at 11461.
156. World Bank, Cities, Seas and Storms 27-8 (2000), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPACIFICISLANDS/Resources/4-Chapter+5.pdf. 
157. Id. at 28.
158. GURUSWAMY, supra note 12, at 191.
159. William C.G. Burns, A Voice for the Fish? Climate Change Litigation and Potential
Causes of Action for Impacts Under the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, 48 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 605, 621-2 (2008). 
160. Bryan Walsh, Crunch Time in Copenhagen: Will Week Two Make a Difference?
TIME, Dec. 12, 2009. 
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prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system,” but 
what that level might be, or what measures must be taken in order to reach 
it, are not specified.161  The UNFCCC did not even require any cuts in 
greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions, though it did “urge” the developed 
countries (known as “Annex I” countries) to cut their emissions back down to 
1990 levels.162  At COP1, the UNFCCC Parties agreed that stronger action was 
necessary, and work began on what would become the Kyoto Protocol.163 
B. The Kyoto Protocol
By the 1997 COP3 meeting in Kyoto, the Parties were ready and willing 
to set binding emissions targets.  The Kyoto Protocol does just that, 
mandating that Annex I Parties reduce their total GHG emissions by 5% 
below 1990 levels for the 2008-12 “commitment period.”164  The Protocol also 
lists specific reduction commitments for each Annex I Party165 and provides 
for a “Clean Development Mechanism,” by which Annex I Parties can fund 
emissions reduction projects in developing countries and use any certified 
reductions toward their own reduction targets.166 
Despite its obvious improvements on the UNFCCC framework, the 
Kyoto Protocol has many serious flaws.  As with the CBD, the wealthier 
countries were forced to make substantial concessions to developing 
countries - most significantly, a complete lack of emissions targets.  This is 
especially problematic because the list of developing countries (non-Annex I 
Parties) includes China, the world’s number one emitter of GHGs, as well as 
India, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, Iran, and South Africa - all among the top 
twenty biggest emitters as of 2005.167  The Protocol also declined to provide 
any compliance mechanism, and mandated that any such “procedures and 
mechanisms . . . entailing binding consequences shall be adopted by means 
of an amendment to this Protocol.”168  Since an amendment to the Protocol 
is only binding on the countries that accept the amendment,169 this 
161. Anita M. Halvorssen, UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the WTO - Brewing
Conflicts or are They Mutually Supportive? 36 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 369, 372 (2008), 
quoting United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art.2, May 29, 
1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107. 
162. Halvorssen, supra note 161.
163. Id.
164. Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate
Change: Kyoto Protocol, art. 3(1), Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (“Kyoto”). 
165. Id. at ann. B.
166. Id. at art. 12.
167. See id. at ann. B; World Resources Institute, Climate Analysis Indicators
Tool (2005 estimate) (WRI), available at http://cait.wri.org/cait.php?page=yearly. 
168. Kyoto, supra note 164, at art. 18.
169. Id. at art. 20.
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effectively allows any party to simply decline any consequences for non-
compliance. 
Thus far, the U.S. has refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.  While the 
Clinton Administration expressed support for binding targets, the Senate 
passed a unanimous resolution before the Kyoto summit declaring that the 
U.S. would not ratify any binding agreement that exempted the developing 
countries.170  As the U.S. is the world’s second-largest emitter of 
anthropogenic GHGs (only recently surpassed by China),171 our absence is 
particularly damaging to the Protocol’s effectiveness.  Under the Protocol, 
the U.S. would have been committed to an emissions reduction of 7% below 
1990 levels during the commitment period of 2008-12.172  Instead, according 
to the latest report we submitted to the UNFCCC Secretariat, our emissions 
were 16.8% higher than 1990 levels by 2007.173 
Then again, ratification of the Kyoto Protocol has not been a very good 
predictor of emissions reductions for other developed countries.  While total 
emissions for all Annex I countries were down 3.9% from 1990 levels by 2007 
(5.2% with land-use changes included), this seems to be mostly a result of 
the inclusion of the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc countries (known as “EIT 
Parties,” for Economies in Transition), whose emissions were down a 
whopping 37% in 2007 (42.2% with land-use changes).174  This is hardly 
surprising, given the general economic downturn in these countries 
following the demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.  For Annex I 
non-EIT Parties, total emissions actually went up - 11.2% over 1990 levels in 
2007, and 12.8% with land-use changes.175  Thus, it appears that many parties 
with healthy economies have been less than inspired to meet even their 
modest reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol.  In fact, 
numerous Annex I Parties have increased their emissions even more than 
the U.S., including Turkey, Australia, Spain, and Canada.176 
C. COP15 and the Future of the Global Climate Change
Regime
With stronger climate science and increased public awareness, 
170. GURUSWAMY, supra note 12, at 199.
171. WRI, supra note 167.
172. Burns, supra note 159, at 622.
173. UNFCCC, National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data for the Period 1990-2007 (Oct.
21, 2009) at 9, available at  http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/sbi/eng/12.pdf. This 
figure excludes land use changes, which, when factored in, bring our emissions 
increase down to a still-shameful 15.8%. 
174. Id. at 8.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 9-10.
 West  Northwest, Vol. 17, No. 2, Summer 2011 
216 
expectations were high for the 2009 15th Conference of the UNFCCC Parties 
in Copenhagen.  As the Conference wore on, however, it become 
increasingly obvious that a consensus would not be forthcoming.  The 
Conference’s final product, known as the Copenhagen Accord, is a 
nonbinding agreement with no individual emissions targets for Annex I 
countries and no real direction for developing countries, either.177  And yet, 
even this skeletal document does not represent any real agreement - the 
Conference finally decided to merely “take note” of the Accord, meaning that 
none of the Parties actually committed to anything at all.178 
In taking stock of COP15’s failure to create an effective climate regime 
in Copenhagen, it may be helpful to look briefly at a global environmental 
regime that has actually worked.  The best example of such a regime is the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal 
Protocol), hailed by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan as “[p]erhaps 
the single most successful international agreement to date.”179  In Montreal, 
the concerns of developing countries were dealt with by allowing for a ten-
year grace period, during which developing countries were allowed to 
continue production of ozone-depleting substances, followed by a 50% 
reduction requirement for the next ten years.180  A “comprehensive funding 
mechanism” was created in 1992, providing a clear incentive for developing 
countries to become Parties.181  Broad participation in turn encouraged the 
developed countries to commit to stricter targets, knowing that their own 
sacrifices would not simply be offset by increased production of the 
controlled substances by non-Parties.182  Moreover, once a country became a 
Party, it was strongly motivated to actually comply with its targets because 
the Montreal Protocol features an effective compliance mechanism, 
including both “hard” sanctions like trade restriction and “soft” measures 
like technical assistance and reporting requirements.183 
At the COP15 meeting in Copenhagen, the one lesson the UNFCCC 
Parties seemed to have learned from Montreal was that funding encourages 
participation.  The developed countries pledged $30 billion per year to a new 
Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, with a goal of increasing to $100 billion 
177. Janet Raloff, Copenhagen Climate Summit Yields ‘Real Deal’ to Limit Greenhouse
Gases,  SCIENCE NEWS, Jan. 30, 2010, at 16. 
178. Id.
179. U.S. Department of State, “The Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer,” available at  http://www.state.gov/g/oes/env/83007.htm. 
180. Sean Cumberlege, Multilateral Environmental Agreements: From Montreal To
Kyoto - A Theoretical Approach to an Improved Climate Change Regime, 37 DENV. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 303, 313-14 (2009). 
181. Id. at 314.
182. Id. at 324.
183. Id. at 325-6.
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per year in 2020.184  However, the details - like where the money will come 
from and how it will be used - have yet to be settled,185 leaving the UNFCCC 
Parties far short of a “comprehensive funding mechanism.”  Meanwhile, an 
effective compliance mechanism does not even seem to be on the 
discussion table, and global warming continues apace, with potentially 
catastrophic consequences for the world’s oceans. 
All things considered, it appears unlikely that international law will be 
able to save vulnerable marine ecosystems from disaster.  The troubles 
plaguing our oceans - overfishing, habitat destruction, pollution, and 
climate change - are all collective action problems to some degree, and the 
international community does not have the strength or cohesiveness to 
handle such problems effectively.  While there have been successes in the 
past, like the Montreal Protocol and the WTO, these may in fact represent 
the high-water mark of global cooperation.  The international community 
appears to be slowly retreating from the “globalization” mindset, as the WTO 
loses ground to regional trading blocs and the unified response of Montreal 
gives way to the nationalist bickering of Copenhagen.  With this in mind, the 
next section turns to a national-level examination of a single fishery - the 
massive Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (“BSAI”) fishery off the coast of 
Alaska - to see if national laws can at least protect an extremely lucrative 
marine ecosystem within a nation’s jurisdiction. 
VII.National Laws: The Case of U.S. Law and the Alaskan
Fishery
In 2003, the Pew Oceans Commission reported that “[t]he legal 
framework that governs [U.S.] oceans is more than thirty years old, and has 
not been updated to reflect the current state of ocean resources or our 
values toward them.”186  The Commission identified three overarching 
problems with American oceans governance: a focus on exploitation over 
environmental integrity, a fragmented legal and institutional regime, and a 
management system aimed at individual species instead of whole 
ecosystems.187  Sadly, this diagnosis remains as valid today as in 2003, 
although as fisheries managers become more scientifically sophisticated, 
momentum may be building towards a more integrated and effective 
system. 
184. Elizabeth Burleson, Climate Change Consensus: Emerging International Law,  34
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 543, 549 (2010). 
185. Id. at 550.
186. Pew Oceans Commission, America’s Living Oceans: Charting a Course for Sea
Change 7 (2003), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/our_work_report_detail. 
aspx?id=30009. 
187. Id. at 9.
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In order to better understand the interactions between law and marine 
biodiversity in the U.S., it will be helpful to focus on a single region and its 
commercial fishery.  Alaska is an obvious choice, as the waters off Alaska’s 
northwest coast contain the largest fishery in the U.S. in terms of both 
harvest and area.188  This fishery is known as the Bering Sea and Aleutian 
Islands Management Area (BSAIMA, or more commonly, just BSAI), and 
pollock is its star product.189  The expected pollock catch for 2010 is 813,000 
metric tons, or “about 40 percent of the world’s total whitefish catch.”190  The 
pollock fishery adopted a modern “catch shares” system in 1999,191 and was 
subsequently certified as sustainable by the Marine Stewardship Council 
(“MSC”), whose assessors described the fishery, after over two years of study, 
as “world-class.”192  However, pollock numbers have fallen in the past couple 
of years and endangered Steller sea lion populations have failed to recover, 
prompting Greenpeace to declare that “the pollock fishery is on the fast-
track to collapse.”193 
A. Biodiversity
The Endangered Species Act (“ESA”)194 is the primary federal law 
designed to safeguard American biodiversity.  Enacted by Congress in 1973, 
the ESA offers protection for plant and animal species listed as 
“endangered” or “threatened,” including protection for the species’ “critical 
habitat.”195  Under the ESA, a federal agency may not take any action deemed 
“likely to jeopardize” a threatened or endangered species or its habitat.196 
The ESA maintains a complicated relationship with other federal laws 
and policies, as illustrated in Alaska by the case of the Steller sea lion. 
Steller sea lions are found throughout the northern Pacific Rim, including 
the Aleutian Islands and the Gulf of Alaska.197  Steller numbers plummeted 
in the 1980s, and the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) listed the 
188. Fishermen’s Finest v. Locke, 593 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 2010).
189. Id. at 888-89.
190. Bruce Barcott, What’s the Catch? ONEARTH (Natural Resources Defense
Council), May 27, 2010. 
191. Id.
192. CLOVER, supra note 51, at 282-91.
193. Jasmin Melvin, Alaska Pollock Fishery Near Collapse: Greenpeace, REUTERS, Oct.
10, 2008. 
194. 16 U.S.C. §§1531-44 (2000).
195. Philip Weinberg, Endangered Statute? The Current Assault on the Endangered
Species Act, 17 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 389, 392 (2006). 
196. Id., quoting 16 U.S.C. §1536(a) (2000).
197. Beth C. Bryant, Adapting to Uncertainty: Law, Science, and Management in the
Steller Sea Lion Controversy, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 171, 173 (2009). 
 West  Northwest, Vol. 17, No. 2, Summer 2011 
219 
Steller as “threatened” under the ESA in 1990.198  Under the Magnuson 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act (later known, after amendment, 
as the Magnuson-Stevens Act), NMFS is responsible for developing and 
adopting fishery management plans in concert with regional fishery 
management councils.199  And, as the agency that listed the Steller sea lion 
under the ESA, NMFS is also responsible for making sure that federal 
actions “are not likely to jeopardize” the Steller sea lion “or adversely modify 
its critical habitat.”200  Thus, before approving the fishery management plan 
of the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (“NPFMC,” the managing 
body of the Alaskan fishery), NMFS was forced to officially consult with itself 
on whether its approval of the proposed plan (a federal action) was likely to 
harm the Stellers.201  This assessment was complicated by the fact that, after 
years of extensive studies, no one was yet able to say for certain what was 
causing the Stellers’ decline.202 
Each time NMFS is called to approve a new NPFMC management plan, 
it must perform its self-consultation and issue a Biological Opinion 
(“BiOp”), addressing the effect of the proposed NPFMC fishery on the Steller 
sea lion.203  In 1992, after the first BiOp found that the fishery posed “no 
jeopardy” to the Stellers, a coalition of environmental groups led by 
Greenpeace challenged NMFS in court, asserting that Alaska’s growing trawl 
fishery threatened the Steller sea lion and other declining species, including 
seals and marine birds that depend on the fish.204  The courts backed NMFS, 
deferring to agency expertise.205  The agency, however, was now under 
pressure, and a new BiOp in 1998 found that “the proposed pollock fishery 
would likely jeopardize the western Steller sea lion population and adversely 
modify its critical habitat, but that the Atka mackerel fishery would not.”206  
The BiOp was immediately attacked from both sides - by environmental 
groups, who challenged the finding of “no jeopardy” for the mackerel fishery, 
and by the fishing industry, who challenged the jeopardy finding for the 
198. Id. at 173-74.
199. Jerry McBeath, Greenpeace v. National Marine Fisheries Service: Steller Sea Lions
and Commercial Fisheries in the North Pacific, 21 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 10 (2004). 
200. Bryant, supra note 197, at 179, citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (Westlaw 2009).
201. Id. at 180.
202. Id. at 177.
203. See McBeath, supra note 199, at 6-7.
204. See id. at 10-11; Bryant, supra note 197, at 181-82.
205. Bryant, supra note 197, at 181, citing Greenpeace v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324 (9th
Cir. 1992). 
206. Id. at 182, citing Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Endangered Species Act Section 7
Consultation: Biological Opinion 114 (1998), available at http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/ 
protectedresources/akground.pdf. 
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pollock fishery.207 
Years of litigation followed, in which an increasingly vulnerable NMFS 
found its every decision challenged and scrutinized.208  At the behest of 
Alaskan Senator Ted Stevens, the federal government poured over $120 
million into Steller sea lion research over four years - an amount that 
“dwarfs the funding for research on other endangered marine animals” - and 
still failed to come to any definite conclusions.209  But the ESA does not 
require scientific certainty; it merely directs agencies to act on the “best 
scientific and commercial data available.”210  In theory, NMFS need only 
estimate the amount of risk the fishery presents to the Stellar sea lions, and 
whether that risk is above acceptable levels.  In reality, the ESA does not 
specify what level of risk is acceptable,211 and science can provide only a 
vague sketch of the relationship between the Steller sea lions and the 
fishery.  With very little guidance from science or the law, NMFS is supposed 
to strike the perfect balance between the interests of a billion-dollar 
industry and a mysterious and struggling sea mammal, under the litigious 
gaze of advocates for both sides.  In this technically and politically difficult 
situation, it is not surprising that NMFS would want to “seek shelter in 
scientific certainty,” but such certainty is not forthcoming on complex 
ecosystem issues, and probably never will be.212 
B. Overfishing
In the U.S., fishery management first got off the ground in 1976, with 
the passage of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act.213  
The Magnuson Act laid out seven standards for federal management of 
fisheries and set up eight regional fishery management councils (overseen 
by NMFS) to handle the actual regulating.214  For the next twenty years, the 
207. Id.
208. Id. at 172, 182-86.
209. Rex Dalton, Is This Any Way to Save a Species? 436 NATURE, July 7, 2005, at 14-
15. 
210. McBeath, supra note 199, at 41, quoting Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(a)(2) (2002).
211. Bryant, supra note 197, at 195-96 (noting that “[t]he jeopardy standard is
intended ‘to give the benefit of the doubt to the species,’” but that “agencies now 
have discretion to allow some unspecified amount of risk, as long as there is ‘a finger 
on the scale, of some indeterminate size, on the side of the species’”) (citations 
omitted). 
212. Id. at 199.
213. Roger Fleming & John D. Crawford, Symposium: Special Strategies for Protecting
Special Areas: Habitat Protection Under The Magnuson-Stevens Act: Can It Really Contribute to 
Ecosystem Health in the Northwest Atlantic? 12 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 43, 47 (2006). 
214. Id.
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management councils generally neglected to prevent overfishing or 
effectively rebuild fish stocks, focusing instead on the demands of the 
industry for more fishing opportunities.215  Amendments to the Act in 1996 
and 2006 emphasized the need for conservation and “economically rational 
exploitation of fish stocks”; these have had mixed results.216  
Depending on whom you ask, the regional fishery management 
councils are either “industry-dominated”217 or a collection of “local 
stakeholders and experts familiar with unique fishery circumstances.”218  The 
devolution of fishery management to these regional councils may be 
considered the “centerpiece” of the Magnuson Act system.219  Under the Act, 
the councils have primary responsibility for crafting Fishery Management 
Plans (“FMPs”) for each fish species in their jurisdiction that requires 
managing, as well as proposing regulations to implement the FMPs.220  The 
councils’ work must be reviewed and adopted by NMFS, acting for the U.S. 
Secretary of Commerce, but this review is supposedly limited to “ensuring 
that each FMP, FMP amendment, and proposed regulation is consistent with 
the [Magnuson Act] and other applicable laws.”221 
In fact, NMFS’s executive authority is bedeviled by unclear legislative 
standards on the one hand, and wildly varying amounts of judicial deference 
on the other.  Many of the applicable laws (like the ESA, discussed above) 
allow federal agencies a great deal of discretion, leaving NMFS torn between 
federal conservation concerns and locally based economic demands, which 
may manifest themselves in the form of powerful and unpredictable U.S. 
Senators (see Section VIIC below).  However, the precise amount of 
discretion that an agency like NMFS can expect “has been understood to 
vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the 
agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the 
215. Josh Eagle, James N. Sanchirico, & Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Symposium:
Breaking the Logjam: Environmental Reform for the New Congress and Administration: PANEL 
VI: Protecting Aquatic Ecosystems: Ocean Zoning and Spatial Access Privileges: Rewriting the 
Tragedy of the Regulated Ocean, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 646, 647 (2008). 
216. Id. at 647-48.
217. Peter Van Tuyn, Symposium: Changing Tides in Ocean Management: Courage
Without Conviction: Cause for Chaos in U.S. Marine Fisheries Management, 28 VT. L. REV. 663, 
666 (2004). 
218. Scott C. Matulich et al., Policy Formulation Versus Policy Implementation Under
the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act: Insight from the North Pacific 
Crab Rationalization, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 239, 243 (2007). 
219. Id. at 240.
220. Peter Van Tuyn & Valerie Brown, A Look Within: Executive Branch Authority to
Ensure Sustainable Fisheries, 14 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 1, 2 (2008). 
221. Matulich, supra note 218, at 240-41, citing 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a), (b).
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persuasiveness of the agency’s position.”222  
The sad irony of power struggles over American fisheries management 
is that almost all parties want the same basic thing: sustainable, productive 
fisheries.  Unfortunately, traditional fisheries management tends to create 
predictable “tragedy of the commons” outcomes.223  Managers set a yearly 
“total allowable catch” (“TAC”), and fishermen then race to catch as much as 
possible for themselves before this limit is reached.224  In the process, fishing 
effort becomes concentrated into a short temporal window, while the 
overcapacity built up to compete with other fishermen provides a strong 
incentive to push the TAC to the highest possible limit, and then a little 
higher.225  While the Magnuson Act originally dictated that the allowable 
catch should “not exceed maximum sustainable yield except in special 
circumstances,” the exception for special circumstances was so flagrantly 
abused that Congress was forced to remove it in the 1996 Sustainable 
Fisheries Act.226 
In 1998, Congress moved to address the problem of destructive 
competition in the BSAI pollock fishery by passing the American Fisheries 
Act (“AFA”), which introduced a cooperative quota system to the fishery.227  
The Alaskan pollock, halibut, and black sablefish fisheries are all currently 
managed under this type of system, in which individual fishing enterprises 
are given allowances of a fixed portion of the yearly TAC.228  This more or less 
eliminates the problematic incentive to create overcapacity, because the 
fixed individual quotas cannot be increased with more or bigger boats.229  
The evolution of the quota system in Alaska is a huge development, as the 
pollock fishery alone is “the largest remaining stock of palatable fish in the 
222. Van Tuyn & Brown, supra note 220, at 13, quoting United States v. Mead, 533
U.S. 218, 227-28 (2000). 
223. Peter Schikler, Symposium: Breaking the Logjam: Environmental Reform for the
New Congress and Administration: Student Article: Has Congress Made It Harder to Save the Fish? 
An Analysis of the Limited Access Privilege Program (LAPP) Provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens 
Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 2006, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 908, 
908 (2008), citing Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE. 1243 (1968); 
see also Bilsky, supra note 45, at 608-09. 
224. Robert T. Deacon, Dominic P. Parker, & Christopher Costello, Symposium:
Property Rights in Environmental Assets: Economic and Legal Perspectives: Improving Efficiency by 
Assigning Harvest Rights to Fishery Cooperatives: Evidence From the Chignik Salmon Co-op, 50 
ARIZ. L. REV. 479, 479 (2008). 
225. See Bilsky, supra note 45, at 610.
226. Id. at 611-12.
227. See North Pacific Fishery Management Council, Impacts of the American
Fisheries Act (2002) (providing a detailed report on the AFA’s implementation and 
effects). 
228. Id.
229. Bilsky, supra note 45, at 610.
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world,”230 supplying a steady flow of whitefish for Gorton’s frozen fish fillets 
and McDonald’s Filet-O-Fish sandwiches.231  Under the quota system, 
Alaskan pollock fishermen claim to have shifted their focus from catching as 
many fish as possible to catching the right size of fish with the least 
bycatch.232  In fact, according to the Marine Stewardship Council, the pollock 
fishery boasts a bycatch rate of less than 1%.233  For comparison, the global 
bycatch rate is estimated at 10% to 20%, and well over 50% for some 
fisheries such as Gulf of Mexico shrimp.234  The NPFMC recently amended its 
FMP to allocate more of the cod catch to the AFA (pollock) fleet, a move 
“motivated by the fact that the AFA trawl [catcher/processor] sector was 
efficient in its Pacific cod fishing, with a higher percentage of its allocation 
being used up by directed fishing”235 - that is, the pollock fleet also has an 
extremely low bycatch rate when catching cod. 
In 2008, the biomass of the U.S. pollock fishery fell from 1.8 million 
tons to 940,000 tons, causing Greenpeace to declare “the world’s largest 
food fishery on the brink of collapse,” the tragic result of overfishing and 
mismanagement.236  But the relationship between fishing and fish biomass 
is not nearly as simple as Greenpeace makes it out to be.  Fish populations 
vary from year to year, and exploited stocks vary more widely than 
unexploited stocks.237  This phenomenon, long noted by ecologists, was 
recently explained by a team of scientists using the fifty-year data set from 
the California Cooperative Oceanic Fisheries Investigations.238  The scientists 
found that, contrary to what one might expect, variations in fishing intensity 
did little to explain the variability observed in harvested populations.239  
Rather, by selectively removing the larger individuals, fishing pushes a 
population’s age structure towards the younger, smaller end of the 
spectrum.240  This is known as juvenescence or “age truncation effect,” and as 
MSY advocates have long claimed, it does appear to boost a population’s 
230. CLOVER, supra note 51, at 87.
231. Id. at 10, 280.
232. Id. at 292.
233. Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), “MSC Fishery Fact Sheet: Alaska
Pollock,” available at www.msc.org/track-a-fishery (select “List of all MSC fisheries,” 
then “Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands pollock,” and download the Fishery Fact Sheet). 
234. Barcott, supra note 190.
235. Fishermen’s Finest, supra note 188, at 893.
236. Melvin, supra note 193.
237. Christian N. K. Anderson et al., Why Fishing Magnifies Fluctuations in Fish
Abundance, 452 NATURE 835, 835 (2008). 
238. Id.
239. Id. at 836.
240. Id.
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growth rate.241  Unfortunately, a higher growth rate leads to increased 
nonlinear, unstable population dynamics, including lows of less than one-
tenth the average population size.242 
These findings would seem to indicate that environmental groups 
should pause before crying “Collapse!” at the first sign of a low-biomass 
year.  On the other hand, the problem of nonlinearity indicates that yearly 
fishing quotas should be approached with even more precaution than 
previously thought, because it is difficult to anticipate the yearly population 
fluctuations of an exploited stock.  Furthermore, age truncation can act as an 
evolutionary selective process, causing the increased variability of exploited 
stocks to become long-term or permanent.243  Thus, even when a fish stock 
has “recovered” in terms of numbers, it may still retain a shifted age 
distribution and concomitant high variability.244  On a positive note, the 
authors of the variability study noted that age shifts in Alaskan fisheries 
have been “relatively minor” compared with other U.S. fisheries, and 
credited Alaska’s superior fishery management.245  This is good news for 
pollock, which already has naturally high population fluctuations.246 
C. Habitat Destruction
Healthy habitat is essential for marine species, especially groundfish 
like cod and halibut, whose juveniles use the sea bed for resting and evading 
predators.247  Although the NPFMC has banned habitat-destroying trawling 
practices in parts of the Alaskan fishery dominated by non-trawlers or crab 
fishermen, the Council has so far been unwilling to do so in other areas 
unless the potential benefits can be “expressed in direct economic terms.”248 
In 1996, Congress passed the Sustainable Fisheries Act, amending the 
Magnuson Act to include, among other conservation issues, the protection 
of fish habitat.249  The fishery management councils and NMFS were directed 
to “describe and identify essential fish habitat” in their fishery management 
plans and to “minimize to the extent practicable adverse effects on such 
habitat caused by fishing.”250  Congress defined “essential fish habitat” very 
241. Id. at 837.
242. Id. at 835-37.
243. Nils Chr. Stenseth & Tristan Rouyer, Destabilized Fish Stocks, 452 NATURE 825,
826 (2008). 
244. Anderson, supra note 237, at 838.
245. Id.
246. MSC, supra note 233.
247. Fleming, supra note 213, at 44.
248. Van Tuyn, supra note 217.
249. Id. at 667-68.
250. Id. at 668, quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(7).
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broadly as “those waters and substrate necessary to fish for spawning, 
breeding, feeding or growth to maturity,” with “fish” defined as virtually all 
marine species aside from mammals and birds.251 
In response to this clear directive, NMFS and the NPFMC dragged their 
feet, preferring to focus on designation of essential fish habitat while 
postponing the politically difficult task of assessing and minimizing the 
habitat effects of the Alaskan fishery.252  Environmental groups sued, and 
NMFS finally started to get moving, publishing a draft environmental impact 
statement on possible fish habitat strategies in 2004 (six years after the 
agency was supposed to have complied fully with the Sustainable Fisheries 
Act).253  However, just as NMFS was beginning to change course, Senator Ted 
Stevens intervened, adding a rider to a 2004 Congressional spending bill 
that prevented any money from being spent on implementing fish habitat 
protection in the North Pacific.254  The NPFMC announced that its favored 
fish habitat protection strategy would be maintaining the status quo, and 
Senator Stevens dropped the rider, pronouncing himself “satisfied with the 
direction the agency was taking, allowing bottom trawling and other fishing 
to continue as is.”255  Ironically, Senator Stevens was one of the original 
champions of the Sustainable Fisheries Act,256 which he then gutted with his 
financial strong-arm tactics.  Congress had changed the “Magnuson Act” to 
the “Magnuson-Stevens Act” in his honor.257 
D. Pollution
In 2008, the EPA released its third comprehensive assessment of the 
health of U.S. coastal waters, entitled National Coastal Condition Report III 
(“NCCR III”).258  Overall, the report concluded, our coastal waters are in “fair” 
shape, with slight improvement from the early 1990s but no real 
improvement since the second report, which assessed data from the late 
1990s.259  Alaska, however, included for the first time in NCCR III, proved to 
251. Id. at 669, quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1802.
252. Id. at 669-70.
253. Id. at 673-75.
254. Id. at 676.
255. Id. at 677, quoting NMFS Takes Testimony on Proposed Trawling Policy, AP,
Jan. 16, 2004. 
256. See id. at 676.
257. Id. at 668.
258. See Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), “National Coastal Condition
Report - NCCR Factsheet”, available at www.epa.gov/owow/oceans/nccr3/nccr3_ 
factsheet.html. 
259. Id.  Although the overall score for all areas rose from 2.3 (out of 5) to 2.8
in NCCR III, this was due entirely to the addition of Alaska and Hawaii, which were 
omitted from the previous reports. 
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be a golden exception, with perfect scores in the three ecological indicators 
measured: water quality, sediment quality, and fish tissue contaminants.260  
The report noted that Alaska’s largely inaccessible coasts, low population 
density, and lack of agriculture all helped to keep its coastline “in pristine or 
near-pristine condition.”261  
While certainly good news for Alaska, the report also raises some red 
flags about possible future developments.  First, the food web does contain 
contaminants like mercury and persistent organic pollutants (“POPs”), 
thought to come primarily from more polluted areas outside of the state.262  
Alaska’s location and environment may make it a “sink” for mercury and 
POPs carried by ocean and wind currents from around the Pacific Rim - a 
problem likely to worsen with rapid development of Pacific Rim countries.263  
Second, Alaska itself continues to develop, with Alaskan coastal populations 
growing by 63% in the period 1980-2003 (the highest growth rate of any U.S. 
coastal region).264  Third, as global climate change continues to melt the 
Arctic sea ice, shipping and other activities in the area are likely to increase, 
with unknown implications for local water quality.265 
A number of federal laws govern marine pollution in the U.S., including 
the Ocean Dumping Act, which regulates the dumping of potentially harmful 
materials into U.S. oceans,266 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 
also known as the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), which regulates the overall 
water quality of “the Nation’s waters.”267  However, as the Pew Oceans 
Commission pointed out, our plethora of marine and coastal laws create an 
uncoordinated patchwork that fails to provide adequate protection for our 
oceans.268  For example, when the Exxon Valdez oil tanker captured the 
nation’s attention by running aground in Alaska in 1989, Congress passed 
the Oil Pollution Act to better manage future oil spills.269  According to the 
260. Id.
261. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), National Coastal Condition Report III
211 (2008), available at www.epa.gov/owow/oceans/nccr3/pdf/chapter8_ak_hi_islands-
a.pdf. 
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 212.
265. See id. at 216-17; Andrew C. Revkin, Arctic Melt Unnerves the Experts, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2007 (noting that “open Arctic waters could be a boon for shipping, 
fishing and oil exploration”). 
266. Mike Mastry, Coral Reef Protection Under the United States Federal Law: An
Overview of the Primary Federal Legislative Means by Which Coral Reef Ecosystems and their 
Associated Habitat May Be Protected, 14 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 6-7 (2006). 
267. Id. at 11, quoting Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §1251(a)
(2006). 
268. Pew Oceans Commission, supra note 186, at 27.
269. Id. at 64.
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National Research Council, however, the amount of oil spilled by the Exxon 
Valdez washes off of our streets and parking lots and into our oceans every 
eight months.270  The CWA, despite its partial success in regulating pollution 
point sources, has done little to control the non-point runoff of oil, 
fertilizers, and other substances that now poses “the greatest pollution 
threat to our oceans and coasts.”271  And of course, the Oil Pollution Act did 
not prevent the Deepwater Horizon fiasco, which is continuing to foul the Gulf 
of Mexico as of this writing and has already surpassed the Exxon Valdez as the 
largest U.S. oil spill ever.272  Predictably, the Congressional response to the 
Deepwater Horizon situation has largely consisted of desultory attempts to 
repeal liability limitations.273 
In addition to the usual marginally effective marine pollution laws, 
Congress has also crafted several pieces of legislation that specifically 
address the “biological pollution” caused by aquatic invasive species, 
including the Lacey Act,274 the Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention 
and Control Act (“NANPCA”),275 and the National Invasive Species Act 
(NISA).276  The Lacey Act has minimal effect, as it deals only with 
importation of a small number of listed “injurious” species.277  The NANPCA 
was primarily directed at the Great Lakes’ infestation of zebra mussels, and 
instructed the U.S. Coast Guard to create a system of voluntary ballast water 
regulations for the region.278  These regulations were later made mandatory, 
as were the Coast Guard’s nationwide ballast regulations promulgated 
under the NISA.279  Under the Coast Guard regulations, all ballast-carrying 
ships in U.S. waters must have a Ballast Water Management Plan, and must 
take basic precautionary measures like cleaning anchors, chains, and tanks, 
and avoiding ballast discharge in protected or coastal areas.280 
270. Id. at 59.
271. Id. at 60.
272. Curry L. Hagerty & Jonathan L. Ramseur, Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Selected
Issues for Congress 1 (2010), available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41262.pdf. 
273. Barry Meier, Calls to Update Maritime Laws, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2010.
274. Lacey Act of 1900, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187, partially repealed by Lacey Act
Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-79, 95 Stat. 1073 (codified as amended at 16 
U.S.C. 701, 3371-3378, 18 U.S.C. 42 (1994)). 
275. Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of 1990
(NANPCA), 16 U.S.C. 4701-4751 (1994). 
276. National Invasive Species Act of 1996 (NISA), 16 U.S.C. 4701-4751 (Supp.
II 1996). 
277. Viki Nadol, Aquatic Invasive Species in the Coastal West: An Analysis of State
Regulation Within a Federal Framework, 29 ENVTL. L. 339, 357-59 (1999). 
278. Hebert, supra note 128, at 320-21.
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Alaska has its own laws limiting the importation of live fish, oysters, 
and scallops, though these laws are limited and do not address other 
potentially invasive species.281  Thus far, aquatic nuisance species have not 
been a serious problem for Alaska, possibly due to its cold climate and 
relatively healthy ecosystems (as compared with other U.S. coastal states).282  
However, this may change as the northern latitudes begin to feel the 
increasing effects of global warming.  Notably, a future ice-free Northwest 
Passage could route a great deal of shipping through Alaskan waters, with 
plenty of opportunity for invasive organisms to hitch a ride on ships’ hulls 
and in ballast tanks.283  Also, climate shifts may affect the ability of invasive 
species to survive or reproduce, while conversely, invasive species and other 
types of marine pollution can lower the resilience of marine ecosystems, 
making them less able to adapt to abrupt climatic changes.284 
E. Climate Change
In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court held that greenhouse gases could be 
covered by the Clean Air Act.285  Under the Court’s ruling, the EPA 
Administrator would have to make an official determination on whether 
GHG emissions from new cars pose a danger to “public health or welfare,” 
and if the answer was yes, the EPA would have to regulate them.286  The EPA 
released its report in December 2009, finding that current and projected 
atmospheric concentrations of GHGs “threaten the public health and welfare 
of current and future generations.”287  The finding is a prerequisite for “the 
first-ever federal greenhouse-gas regulations for both cars and industrial 
sources such as power plants.”288  The EPA decision was challenged in the 
Senate by a coalition of industrial-state Democrats and Republicans, led by 
Alaskan Senator Lisa Murkowski, but the “disapproval resolution” was 
281. Nadol, supra note 277, at 370-71.
282. Id. at 369-70.
283. Christopher R. Pyke et al., Current Practices and Future Opportunities for Policy
on Climate Change and Invasive Species, 22(3) CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 585, 587-88 (2008). 
284. Id. at 586.
285. Roger R. Martella, Jr., The New Regulatory Climate: Greenhouse Gas Regulation in
the Obama Administration: Symposium Article: Climate Change Along the Northeast Corridor: 
How Washington and New York Are Approaching and Preparing for Greenhouse Gas Controls, 18 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 14, 17 (2010), citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
286. Id. at 17-18.
287. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), “Endangerment and Cause or
Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act,” 
available at http://epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment.html. 
288. Siobhan Hughes & Corey Boles, Senate Rejects Ban on Greenhouse-Gas Rules,
WALL ST. J., June 10, 2010. 
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narrowly defeated.289 
In March 2010, the EPA also agreed to address the ocean acidifying 
effects of climate change under the Clean Water Act.290  Under the 
agreement, which forms part of a lawsuit settlement, the EPA is currently 
accepting public comment on how states might monitor and regulate ocean 
acidity.291  Strong EPA action should be good news for Alaska (despite the 
objections of Sen. Murkowski), where acid levels in the Gulf of Alaska and 
Bering Sea “are increasing more quickly and more severely than previously 
thought.”292  
Alongside the EPA regulatory developments, the U.S. Congress has 
been moving on a parallel track towards a comprehensive cap-and-trade 
regime for GHG emissions.  However, with legislative momentum stalled in 
the Senate, cap-and-trade advocates are now considering starting with a 
limited bill that would only cover electrical utilities.293  American utility 
companies already have experience  with cap-and-trade under the Clean Air 
Act’s acid rain program, which met sulfur dioxide reduction targets “at 
approximately half the cost of traditional regulation.”294  Notably, it is the 
industries left out of the limited Congressional bill that are worried, as they 
will be subject to the forthcoming (and costly) EPA regulations, which the 
covered utilities would probably be exempted from.295 
Of course, even if the U.S. were to slash its GHG emissions tomorrow, 
this alone would not solve the problem of climate change in Alaskan waters. 
The genuinely global nature of the problem makes it impossible for any 
nation to deal with unilaterally, while the localized nature of climate change 
effects makes it difficult to predict what will happen in any given ecosystem. 
Alaska’s northern latitude has tended to amplify warming effects in recent 
years, with retreating glaciers, widespread forest fires, and melting 
permafrost already causing trouble throughout the state.296  Then again, if 
the changes become severe enough to disrupt ocean currents, Arctic and 
289. Id. The Senate vote was 53-47 against the resolution.
290. Allison Winter, Some See Clean Water Act Settlement Opening New Path to GHG
Curbs, N.Y. TIMES, March 12, 2010. 
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N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2010. 
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sub-Arctic regions could actually experience a cooling effect.297  Perhaps due 
to this extreme unpredictability, recent research on climate change and 
Alaskan fisheries seems to be focusing on adaptive management 
strategies.298 
Meanwhile, the NPFMC has recently begun to consider and account for 
climate change in its fishery management plans.299  In response to warming 
trends in the Arctic Ocean, the Council adopted the first FMP for the Arctic 
Management Area, banning all commercial fishing there until sufficient data 
can be collected on which to base sound management decisions.300  In 2007, 
the Council also published a Fishery Ecosystem Plan (“FEP”) for the Aleutian 
Islands.301  The FEP is the result of a pilot project to create “an overarching 
document, which provides an ecological context for fishery management 
decisions affecting the Aleutian Islands area.”302  This innovative program 
will allow the Council to consider the fishery at an ecosystem level and 
study the local interactions between system-wide factors like fishing and 
climate change. 
Unfortunately, there is only so much the Council can do about climate 
change.  Continuing acidification in Alaskan waters could prove deadly to all 
shell-forming sea creatures, from king crab to tiny pteropods, the planktonic 
mollusks that comprise fully half of an Alaska pink salmon’s diet.303  And the 
effects of acidity are not confined to shellfish and their predators.  A recent 
study found that pollock respond to oceanic acidity by increasing their 
blood levels of bicarbonate, which acts as an acid buffer.304  Further research 
is needed to determine whether the pollock are getting the bicarbonate from 
seawater or from dissolving their own bones.305 
VIII. Conclusion
Jeremy Jackson concludes his 2008 survey of oceanic peril with a few
recommendations for immediate action to address the greatest threats to 
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marine ecosystems worldwide.306  The first, and probably the easiest, is 
sustainable fishery management.  As the overall success of the Alaskan 
fishery demonstrates, rational, science-based fishery management is both 
possible and politically viable.  Under the UNCLOS Straddling Fish Stocks 
Agreement, global fishery management is gradually shifting towards 
regional bodies, in which all parties with an economic interest in the fishery 
can cooperate to preserve the common resource.  Hopefully, as this system 
strengthens, international fisheries will follow the Alaskan fishery’s progress 
in the direction of adaptive and ecosystem-based management. 
Jackson’s second, and more difficult, recommendation is to shift our 
agricultural practices away from the “[h]eavily subsidized overuse of 
chemical fertilizers and pesticides, poor soil management practices, and 
unregulated animal production systems” that lead to polluted runoff in our 
coastal waters.307  As demonstrated by the slow uptake of UNEP’s 
“Programme of Action” for land-based marine pollution, even regional 
bodies may have a difficult time mustering the political will to effectively 
address this issue.  Unlike fisheries, in which the actors using the resource 
are also those affected by it, the agricultural actors causing marine pollution 
are likely to be far removed, both geographically and economically, from the 
downstream results of their actions.  The apparent failure of the WTO’s Doha 
Round showed that the developed world’s agricultural sector has 
tremendous political power - enough to squash even the economically 
rational subsidy cuts desired by the developing countries,308 and probably 
more than enough to override the interests of marine conservationists and 
coastal communities.  It is hard to imagine a regional governing body that 
could reconcile the interests of, say, native Alaskans who subsist on 
mercury-contaminated salmon and the industrial and agricultural interests 
as far away as Asia who are the source of such pollutants. 
Jackson’s final recommendation, and almost certainly the most 
difficult of all, is to confront the threat of climate change by shifting our 
economy away from fossil fuels.309  If marine pollution poses a more 
complicated problem than fishery management because of the geographic 
and economic separation of causes and effects, then climate change 
presents the most complex and globalized problem imaginable.  Jackson 
readily acknowledges that climate change and its effects “comprise the 
greatest challenge to humanity today,” one whose solution “will require all 
of the ingenuity humanity can muster and will preoccupy us for the 
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remainder of the century.”310  But he also points out that localized action to 
protect marine ecosystems remains relevant, because healthy ecosystems 
are more resilient and better able to adapt to the coming changes.  The 
North Pacific Fishery Management Council may not be able to do much to 
prevent climate change, but it can study and gain understanding of the 
effects of climate change on Alaskan marine ecosystems, and adjust its 
fishery management accordingly.  As Jackson points out, such local 
measures may be able to “buy time” for ecosystems until the global 
community figures out how to bring its GHG emissions under control.311  
Hopefully, studying the interactions between local ecosystems and climate 
change will also provide momentum for a global solution to the problem by 
showing us just how much we have to lose, and just how close we really are 
to losing it. 
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